when the theory was "pushed to such extremes" as to derive "the most strongly marked 'natural orders' of plants and animals from a very few originals". 19 At the Cape similar reservations surfaced. Thus in his May 1871 lecture to the Subscribers to the South African Library, he exempted the human race from the reign of evolution on account of "the total absence of transitional forms" but insisted that he was not opposed to its application to the rest of the animal kingdom: "I cannot but suppose that Evolution has played an important part in the formation of the various genera and species of plants and animals", he conceded. Nevertheless he was dismayed at the materialism that seemed to govern contemporary science, the positivism that prevailed in philosophy, and the creeping sense that "instead of God having made man" it was increasingly fashionable to suspect that it might be precisely the other way round. Still, while he espoused a hybrid account of zoological history -fusing creationist and evolutionary mechanisms -he held Darwin in high esteem: "I have the highest respect for Mr. Darwin. The moderation with which he states his views, and the candour with which he sets forth objections to them, are above all praise". 20 Like Noble, moreover, Barkly insisted that even if human evolution by natural selection were to be confirmed beyond a shadow of doubt, the theological shockwaves could be easily absorbed.
More conspicuously supportive was the anonymous review of volume. 21 The writer was convinced that "the more complete our knowledge of organic structures becomes, only the stronger and more convincing grows the evidence that the wide interval formerly supposed to exist between the highest animal and those next to him in rank can no longer be insisted on, and must ultimately be recognized as imaginary.
The differences that do exist are palpably differences of degree only, and not of kind".
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Initially the anonymous reviewer turned to Darwin's thinking on the role of sexual selection in racial differentiation, but soon came to the view that Darwinism's real challenge lay in the expansion of evolution's empire into the moral and mental realms.
The article laid out Darwin's account with clarity and disinterest, though the author did pause to insert a lengthy excerpt from John Henry Newman insisting that it was "pregnant with warning to those who would hastily condemn views of the mental and moral status of animals such as Mr. Darwin so ably suggests". 23 To be sure, the writer was in no doubt that the Descent of Man "will meet with severe (and in many quarters hostile) criticism", but remained convinced that "highly speculative though it is and as its author admits it to be", the Descent "is not a work to be treated lightly or contemptuously, as if it were but the crude notions of a mere fanciful theorist". "Whatever errors the progress of discovery may reveal in the elaborate superstructure of Evolution" the author concluded, "…it must be acknowledged that the foundations are securely based upon the broadest and firmest of the known facts of organic existence".
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Less convinced, it seems, was the anonymous contributor who used the death of the great Swiss-born naturalist Louis Agassiz, in December 1873, as an occasion to juxtapose Darwin's theory with the fixist views of the Harvard palaeontologist. Reprinting the memorial from the New York Times, along with a lengthy extract from Agassiz's Evolution and Permanence of Type just published in the Atlantic Monthly, this writer interpolated his own observation that because "the Darwinian theory" was "so often spoken of by sciolists and dogmatists as an established and demonstrated truth … it will serve a good purpose to show that one of the foremost, if not the very first, naturalist of the age rejects it altogether as being anything more than a mere interesting speculation". 25 In religious circles varying judgements on Darwin were also forthcoming. On the most oppositional front was the Archdeacon of George, Peter Parry Fogg, later Vicar- 1872 claiming that Darwin's theory was "absurd", because it was self-contradictory;
"baseless", because of its evidential paucity; and "monstrous", because it subverted religion. As part of his argument against human evolution he urged that among "the races of Africa" were some of the "lowest specimens of humanity and almost side by side with them is found man's pretended ancestor, the gorilla" and that black degradation was evidence enough to refute the idea of progressive evolution. 26 By contrast, while he was not convinced that the theory as yet enjoyed undisputed empirical corroboration, the Reverend (later Sir) Thomas E. Fuller, Baptist pastor, journalist and liberal politician, as well as confidant and biographer of Cecil Rhodes, told the readers of the Cape Argus -of which he was editor -in April 1871 that Christian believers had nothing to fear from human evolution were it shown to be true. "It would not affect those human instincts which constitute the root of religious, moral and refined sentiment", he announced, nor indeed "belief in the historic development of religious faith".
These rather high-altitude dealings with Darwinism ran the gamut of opinion from occasional repudiation and reluctant tolerance to partial endorsement and enthusiastic advocacy. But the prevailing sense of these early appraisals is of a liberal intelligentsia calmly interacting with a novel theory with all due deference. Even if its more farreaching speculations about human ancestry came to be confirmed, the Cape Monthly's contributors gave every impression that the settled cosmos of Cape Colony could fairly painlessly accommodate itself to the new evolutionary framework.
Birds, Butterflies and Bushmen
Engagements with Darwin's proposals, however, were not simply philosophical or In comparable vein J.C. Seaman, another medical practitioner, published an essay designed to test the hypothesis that colour variation in butterflies could be explained by the influence of climatic conditions on the chrysalis stage of Lepidoptera development.
Temperature directly determined the duration of this phase of the insect's life-cycle, and thus the time of the emergence of the pupa from the larva. Seaman believed that he had field evidence to support the view that a butterfly's markings reflected the length of time it had been in the chrysalis state, and he was inclined to think that the early onset of pupation was thus a "primary cause of variation" since such insects bore the marks of premature evolution. He made it clear, however, that this process did not produce new species and called on "Mr Darwin's researches on atavism or reversion to type" to confirm that "modifications produced by certain causes disappear with the cessation of that action". 30 The most far-reaching recruitment of Darwinian idioms for research purposes, however, was in the field of African philology by Wilhelm H. I. Bleek whose celebrated investigations into the development of language were conducted within the framework of the evolution of species. What leant particular cultural significance to Bleek's project was the racial prism though which his work on the colony's indigenous language systems was refracted. While perhaps rather less frequently paraded in the Cape than among the cognoscenti in other places where racial politics dominated the horizon, 31 Bleek's analysis of African languages fitted very comfortably into a social evolutionary developmental schema. As he explained to the readers of the Cape Monthly in 1873, the languages spoken within the Colony were of major scientific importance because they exemplified very early forms of the three families that he believed encompassed the vast bulk of human tongues. Kafir was "the key" to elucidating prefix-pronominal languages;
Hottentot exhibited "the most primitive" type of sex-denoting languages; and Bushman, which had no sense of gendered nouns, was critical to solving the problem of the genderless or Turanian languages. To Bleek, the Bushmen were of special importance, for he was sure that with them he was in direct contact with language users who occupied "the lowest position with regard to civilization" at a particularly early stage of mental development.
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Bleek had long maintained that the study of philology was fundamentally a moral science in the sense that its whole animus was to "elucidate the history and the whole course of the development of human-kind, and to give an insight into the character of man, and the varying nature of the human mind". With that conviction firmly in place from shortly after his arrival in southern Africa, he was persuaded that the Cape provided an ideal laboratory for solving the problems of the evolution of human language systems. supported a monogenist conception of the human species and thus also buttressed the unity of humankind -a conviction that chimed with biblical confessionalism and colonial patronage alike. In a letter to his cousin in October 1874, for example, he insisted that "the more I study the lowest languages, the more I become convinced that probably all presently spoken languages have grown out of a formation which has taken place a long time ago", and went on to chide Haeckel for resorting to Max Müller as an "authority" supporting polyphylecticism with the barbed quip: "It is very clear that he does not understand the languages which he writes about". 48 In addition, Bleek sustained lengthy correspondence with missionaries throughout the length and breadth of South Africa.
Moreover his outlook could be thought to fit rather well with the sentiment that 'lower races' could be improved through colonial tutelage and paternalistic governance.
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Bleek's standing therefore remained high. It was called upon by the missionarylinguist F.V. Kolbe, for example, who hoped that at a time when "the question of the Descent of Man is again engaging a good deal of public attention" there would be comparable interest in the origin of language. Kolbe was certain that even though the language-making capacity was the gift of divine reason, it was mistaken to think that "the first man was miraculously endowed with a copious philosophical language". 50 The educationalist Langham Dale, who as we shall see remained hostile to Haeckel's evolutionism, was pleased to note that the "Professor pays a graceful tribute to the labours … of our own friend Dr. Wilhelm Bleek" and hoped that "a worthy successor
can be found to carry on and complete his studies of the South African languages". 
The Dale Debate
In June that year, new vigour was injected into the debate courtesy of the speech Dale natural process could deliver an immortal soul, nor -following Alfred Russel Wallacethe ways in which "civilized man arrests those influences of nature which acted freely upon him in a low savage condition". Still, while favourably citing Agassiz's critique, he did nonetheless allow for the operation of natural selection as an agent of organic change though insisted that it failed to explain the origin of "the source of vital power" itself.
More than half of his article, however, was given over to the question of the evolution of language. To Dale, there were "countless difficulties" facing any developmental account assuming that "interjectional utterances prompted by … sensations" could be the "germ of articulate speech". 58 This led him to announce that the "original unity of language" remained unproven and to look favourably on Max Müller's conviction that researchers could no longer aspire to trace all language to a common root. 59 Such a theory, anyway, was much too premature and required a lot of empirical work in places like South Africa itself where some linguistic groups retained mechanical sounds which were supposed to be lingering "traces of the primal language". It was the same for comparative religious 55 belief systems; as a subject of scholarly inquiry it was too poorly developed to provide support for speculations about including a "faculty of faith" among humanity's "mental attributes".
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Dale's intervention provoked a number of responses in the weeks that followed, but whatever stance they adopted, their tone was moderate and considered. In July, an anonymous author contributed an article on the question of the origin of language contesting Dale's anti-evolutionary declarations. The writer made it clear that the proposal that "language is a direct gift from Heaven is as consistent with the theory of physical evolution as with that of specific creation", but nonetheless argued that Dale's account of linguistic evolution was faulty. 61 The idea that human speech could have developed by means of natural selection, or some related evolutionary mechanism, from the imitative articulations of pre-human hominids was entirely plausible to the author. By hasty. It was just mistaken to infer the sterility of certain variations in nature from such artificial cases. Why? "Nature selects not for one quality", the author announced, "but for the whole assemblage of qualities which go to the continuance of the species.
Fertility, constitutional strength, ability to procure food, power to endure the vicissitudes of the climate, -every point, in fact, is considered in natural selection". Besides, nature worked "more patiently" than human breeders; it was "never in a hurry". In consequence what "at first sight appears to be a serious objection to theory of evolution turns out on consideration to be not only no objection at all, but even to explain an unanticipated difficulty". 
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A few weeks later, in the October issue, Dale replied to his critics. His tone was firm, but conciliatory, and while it is clear that he misconstrued some of the comments that his detractors had made, he insisted that some agnosticism on the explanatory value of evolution by natural selection did not mean that he intended to advance "an argument subversive of the truth of the theory, but only as a reason why the mind should be kept in a state of receptivity for further evidence". 69 Here he briefly reiterated his feelings about the immutability of the human species, the absence of transitional forms in the fossil record, and his own sense that "a vital energy" pervaded the material world.
Nevertheless he chose to end his commentary with the words of John Tyndall: "I do not think that the evolution hypothesis is to be flouted away contemptuously. I do not think it is to be denounced as wicked. It is to be brought before the bar of disciplined reason, those who wisely oppose it; and let us tolerate those, and they are many, who foolishly try to do either of these things. The only thing out of place is dogmatism on either side". recently delivered "to our excited imagination the earth peopled with a race of naked little savages long prior to Bible Adam". 71 The image of primitive savagery they had collectively conjured up was "diametrically opposed to the teachings of Scripture, and dangerous in its tendencies", and ran roughshod over the "doctrine of man's fall from a higher state of pristine innocence". 72 At the same time, the theory of special creation was beset by numerous difficulties. The idea of the immediate creation of the first human from the dust of the earth seemed "altogether unnatural and contra-indicated by the whole method" of divine working in the world. It was, frankly, "altogether unsatisfactory to a reasoning and philosophic mind". W.G.'s own solution was, in essence, the proposal that Mivart had recently put forward in his 1871 Genesis of Species. Namely, by conceiving of the human species as "the possessor of two natures, a physical and a psychical". On the physical side, the writer went on, "man … may be legitimately descended from an inferior race, while in virtue of his psychical [nature] he is a special act of Divine creation". That provided a middle way: "To maintain that in his body man is an evolution, and in his spirit he is a special creation at once removes the objections to 70 and adjudicating on origin theories. All "religious theories, schemes and systems which embrace notions of cosmogony" he proclaimed, "… must … submit to the control of science, and relinquish all thought of controlling it. Acting otherwise proved disastrous in the past, and it is simply fatuous to-day". Along the way he expressed his enthusiasm for far surer guides -Democritus, Lucretius, Darwin, Spencer and the like -and took the trouble to pour scorn on the comfort theologians had derived from Newton's passion for divine revelation by insisting that brilliance in one sphere of inquiry was no guarantee of merit in another. Championing his own brands of atomism and materialism 74 he willingly succumbed to the Lucretian "temptation" to declare Nature capable of doing "all things spontaneously of herself without the meddling of the gods". when science would break "in upon the minds of the youth of Ireland" and deliver to them a sure "check to any intellectual and spiritual tyranny". "We fought and won our battle even in the Middle Ages" he announced; "why should we doubt the issue of a conflict now?" 75 All of this was part of a concerted campaign on the part of a number of professionalising scientists to wrest cultural authority from the hands of the clergy. 76 And it had certainly had the desired effect, for it threw local churchmen into a spasm as
Tyndall found himself at the centre of a storm of controversy, much to his delight, that winter. 77 Even George Bernard Shaw put into the mouth of one of his characters, Mrs Whitefield, the comment: "Nothing has been right since that speech that Professor
Tyndall made at Belfast". 78 Tyndall's name, of course, was already well known to readers of the magazine. Apart from anything else, the Monthly had carried a biographical sketch of Tyndall the previous year, likely authored by Roderick Noble, in which he lauded the physicist's determined search for scientific truth. More particularly his "absolute unbelief in the facts alleged by spiritualists" received Noble's hearty approval. 79 But there were clouds on the horizon too. Not least of these was Tyndall's role in the prayer-gauge controversy, which sought to test the efficacy of prayer by scientific methods; here, along with figures like Francis Galton, he had sought, as Theodore Porter nicely puts it, "to crush mystical piety under a heap of miscellaneous statistical facts". 80 That introduced a coolness into Noble's otherwise enthusiastic assessment; for it demonstrated a "twist" in Tyndall's mind-set that made "a few of his writings rather dangerous for unstable minds".
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If that introduction set the tone for Tyndall's intellectual reputation at the Cape, the opening remarks that staged the reprint of his original Belfast address added a temperamental element to his public persona. Here readers were told that "notwithstanding the studied attempt at moderation of expression", the piece manifested "an intense bitterness of feeling" which was nothing short of astonishing. Besides, Tyndall's rhetoric was not always to be believed. The Monthly's editor wasn't convinced by Tyndall's insistence that the new version of the lecture, which had just appeared, was only slightly modified; he found it to be a very different beast indeed. A "most ominous passage" in the first printing, for example, was now "translated into harmless necessitarianism". All in all, the new printing was "so metamorphosed that had it been delivered at Belfast in its present shape it would probably have excited no other feeling than one of almost unqualified admiration for the exhaustiveness of its research and the exquisite beauty of its style". 82 But the Cape Monthly readers could judge for themselves.
The lengthy passage now before them was taken from the original publication in the pages of Nature.
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That was certainly the version that James Cameron, Professor of Classics and English at the South African College, and sometime Congregationalist clergyman, had read as he prepared for an evening address that October at Sea Point where, for nearly forty years, he conducted non-denominational services. 84 The November issue of the Monthly carried the full text of his homily. Cameron had earlier expressed his views on the need to separate science and religion into different provinces in a lecture to the South African Public Library in 1870 as a means of dealing with the threat of materialism in physical science. In surveying the current intellectual scene, he had paused to comment on those "who rejoice in the present growth of Physical Science, because they believe that it will deliver the world from the bondage of religious creeds and doctrines which they have learnt to dislike. They believe that Science is to displace Theology from its long sway over the life of man," he lamented, "and substitute the certainties of ascertained fact for the fluctuations of faith". 85 Now, in 1874, he was thus particularly peeved to see the way
Tyndall had violated established protocol by using his position as President of the British
Association to speak on subjects far beyond his remit -something that local opponents in Belfast also fastened upon. 86 Tyndall simply had not confined himself "as his predecessors in the chair had done, to a calm and critical survey of the progress of science"; instead he had chosen to transgress the boundary between science and faith by using "his high position for the purpose of advocating and developing those views which have already done so much to shock the religious sense of his countrymen". By so doing he "took his place with those who reject Christianity as a delusion, and a living God as a fast-dying superstition". Along the way Cameron also insisted that it was folly to cleave to the idea of religious sentiment as serviceable to the human race while querying the objective reality of God's existence, hit out at reductionist atomism, and turned Tyndall's sour comment on Newton's theological predilections back on himself: "the comfort and assurance which Christians may have from the fact that Newton wrote in defence of Christianity are at least as reasonable as any fear and trembling which may arise from the fact that Professor Tyndall denounces it as a superstition". humanitarianism, however, he later reneged on his support for Xhosa famine relief judging that "idleness" was the Xhosa's "besetting sin" and turning against what he believed to be Khoikhoi treachery in asserting their land ownership. 94 At the same time he strenuously campaigned for religious freedom, the provision of higher education for men and women alike, and the abolition of capital punishment in the Cape. 95 In his early years he acted, for a period, as secretary of the Irish Unitarian Christian Society contributing several articles to a journal edited by his brother Scott in which he claimed that evangelicalism, with what he took to be its contempt for literature and science, had an inherently corrupting inclination. Given these sentiments it is not at all surprising that he enthusiastically supported the activities of the South African Library which, as Dubow observes, he saw as "a beacon of enlightenment and education", 96 describing it as "the Library of every man in the community" and fundamental to "the instruction of the people -of the whole people -of the people of every age, and sex, and class, and colour". 97 In 1873 he returned to Ireland where he lived with his brother in Belfast until his death in 1880. During these years he witnessed first hand the altercations over
Darwinism that were stirred up in the city by Tyndall's presidential pronunciamento.
William made it clear that many students of Darwinism did not think it either pernicious or destructive, and confessed that on the subject he "dare not dogmatise".
But he remained cautious. It was disturbing that "Atheism, -avowed, aggressive, and here and there almost intolerant -is preached as the first and legitimate outcome of Physical Science". And so he expressed considerable disquiet over the radically naturalistic Darwinism of Haeckel -concerns that mirrored the fears about the Tyndallinspired scientific 'atheism' that John had expressed a couple of years earlier and which the Monthly had reprinted at the time. To William Porter, mechanistic accounts of the human species that denied teleological operations were deeply troublesome. For in teaching that what was long thought to be designed was nothing but the product of "the blind mechanical actions of the atoms, the only eternal things", they presented a picture of Nature as nothing "admirable" but "full of blunders". That was bad enough. sentiments". What disturbed him most was the heartless eugenic rhetoric that was often on Haeckel's lips. Killing off "all sickly, weak, and crippled children" as an act of "artificial selection, to promote the survival of the fittest", and the way in which Haeckel derided "the cry which the 'so-called human Civilization' would set up against any one who should now make such a proposal" did not exactly warm Porter's heart. "Christendom", he proclaimed "does not kill its sickly, weak, and crippled children. It builds hospitals for them". How different that creed was from Haeckel's Darwinian vision of a world characterised by "a pitiless and most embittered struggle of all against all".
98 All of this, Porter was convinced, was rooted in materialist and mechanical conceptions of human understanding that subverted human dignity. Porter's discourse was soon the locus of some debate. Writing under the pseudonym 'Omega', a member of the new university charged him with "conservative prejudices", with a determination to "repress" research in "all branches of Biology", and with an inclination to squeeze Darwin into "harmony with an a priori conception of his own".
These accusations were the subject of a rebuttal in the December volume of the magazine. The anonymous author insisted that it was Haeckel, rather than Darwin, who was the object of Porter's scorn and that in all likelihood Haeckel would concede that
Porter had interpreted him aright. As for the Darwinian component, the author insisted that the only point at which this charge seemed remotely relevant was when Porter Haeckel's "extravagance". Indeed the writer felt sure that "Mr. Darwin would endorse the statement".
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Intellectual trafficking between Belfast and Cape Colony did much to shape how Darwin's theory was talked about among the English-speaking cognoscenti in the wake of Tyndall's bolt from the blue. And, to some degree at least, it continued to cast its shadow over the Monthly's rendezvous with Darwin in the months and years that followed.
The Spectre of Materialism
In the aftermath of Tyndall's onslaught, matters of materialism, atomism, and teleology were now firmly lodged at the heart of debates at the Cape over the new evolutionary science of life. And they continued to be taken up by the Monthly's correspondents.
Writing under the initials S.C.N., for example, one writer contributed a range of articles over the following months on related themes. Materialism was the first port of call.
"Great has been horror expressed against this fearful bugbear" the author began. But more careful scrutiny would soon show that "we are somewhat too apt to disquiet ourselves in vain" for the "supposed materialist will often be found to be as much a mystic as anything else". A set of philosophical reflections on the properties of matter led S.C.N. quickly to the conclusion that a properly construed "metaphysical conception of the material universe … is equally in harmony with the old and new theories of creation and evolution". thought that evolution was "necessarily irreverent" was "an accusation that scarcely requires to be seriously combated". religion's true worth lay in its cultivation of charity, self-sacrifice, and "those graces which raise human creatures above themselves".
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Darwinian Imaginations
Fears about the metaphysics of evolutionary materialism, of course, was not a universal preoccupation. Others simply assumed the truth of Darwinian evolution and put it to work for their own purposes. An anonymous writer on the "Origin and Antiquity of Man", for example, just presupposed that human evolution had occurred and called on Mivart's dualism to alleviate any theological tensions. Reviewing the emerging evidence for early human development -the discovery of flint implements, cave art, lake dwellings, kitchen middens and the like -the author insisted that "Not only is the belief in man's vast and still unknown antiquity universal among men of science, but it is hardly disputed by any well-informed theologian". Indeed to this correspondent "the present generation of science-students must … be somewhat puzzled to understand what there was in the earliest discoveries that should have aroused such general opposition and been met with such universal incredulity". After all Mivart had shown how perfectly coherent it was to adopt evolution "as regards physical structure" while seeking an alternative account of "man's whole intellectual and moral nature". 116 The writer's concern, however, was with the tendency of some evolutionists to over-exaggerate the very great antiquity of the human race to comply with their theoretical prescriptions -and in advance of empirical corroboration. Others, meanwhile, had been mobilising evolutionary narratives for quite different purposes. In a three-part series introducing readers to the geology of South Africa, the English-born geologist, ethnologist, poet and watercolourist, George W. Stow sketched something of the different epochs through which the earth had passed. 118 The articles showed Stow to be fully abreast of current developments in the earth sciences but that did nothing to weaken the doxological science to which he was committed. Instead, the profound sense of deep time that pervaded his narrative impressed on him a marked sense of awe and wonder. When pondering on the increase of insect life since the end of the Palaeozoic Era, he exclaimed: "Surely the result of such studies as these must be to fill us with astonishment and deep feelings unknown before, if we but for a moment meditate how these things reveal to us, through ages whose numbers we cannot conceive, the eternal wisdom and perfection of the works of the great Creator". 119 And that was entirely in keeping with the sense of evolutionary teleology that manifested itself in his account of human development. No sooner had he paraphrased Huxley's observation that "the anatomical divergences between the highest anthropoid ape and the lowest type of man is much less than that between the lowest man and the highest Caucasian" than he added: "Thus with regard to the history of life on the earth, science seems to teach us that in the divine mind there was no need of after thoughts -no need of experimental or successive creations, -but that there was one grand stream of vitality, that issuing from the beginning from that glorious First Cause, has continued its onward progress from then until it has reached ourselves!" The issue here rotated around the tensions involved in applying general legislative principles in a society where long-established local customs fell foul of imperial proclamations. Was it "unmerciful and unjust to have one set of laws and institutions"
for both "Shemite and Hamite entities", or should there be "one public law" for all? 126 Should the law be colour-blind or not? That was the question -how to balance universal justice with cultural relativism, and nowhere was this friction so pointedly manifest as in the practice of tribal polygamy. Berry was convinced that evolutionary theory provided a way out of the impasse. Because of the central role of adaptation in the Darwinian scenario, it seemed to Berry that to "subject any organism to a great and sudden change must be a source of great evil to such a organism" for the simple reason that its features had been preserved by virtue of their significant survival value. 127 To be sure, Darwin primarily had in mind the evolution of the physical constitution in elaborating his law of natural selection. But Berry was sure there was an "analogous law" which applied to the "mental constitution" and that meant that "revolutionizing" a "social system" by the rough-shod application of imperial legislation was seriously ill-advised. Hastening slowly -"festina lente" -Berry insisted "should be our motto". To Berry, then, the cultivation of a single legislative system was the right way to proceed but it was no less fitting to temper its obligations to "native subject-allies", by what he called "a salutary laissez-faire", until, in true evolutionary fashion, they gradually adapted their culture to its requirements. 128 While in some places Darwinian language could be called upon to underwrite colonial extermination and tribal dispossession, here it was enlisted to rationalize cultural amalgamation and gradualist assimilation. Scientific knowledge remains of the most potent forces on the face of the earth.
Only by inspecting how specific communities in specific locations dealt with its latest proposals will we come to understand how its power operates over space and time.
